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INTEROPERABILITY OF UNITED STATES
AND CANADIAN ARMED FORCES
GARY WALSH*
I. INTRODUCTION
When the soldiers of the First Special Service Force (FSSF)
scaled the sheer cliffs of Mount de la Difensa in Italy during the evening of December 2, 1943, they surprised the German defenders and
1
seized key terrain that had resisted such capture for months. The
complexity of this operation would have challenged the elite infantry
forces of either Canada or the United States. Nevertheless, this unit,
composed of soldiers wearing the uniforms of both nations and led by
both Canadian and United States officers and noncommissioned officers, accomplished this and other equally difficult missions during the
latter part of WWII.2
Since WWII, Canada and the United States (U.S.) have built on
this legacy, forging a remarkable military partnership, performing
3
4
combined or multinational military operations. Perhaps the most
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* Gary Walsh is the International and Operational Law Advisor, Office of the Staff
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United States Northern Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author. They are not intended and should not be thought to represent official ideas, attitudes, or policies of the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Northern Command, the
Department of Defense, or any agency of the United States Government.
1. Scott R. McMichael, Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, Combat Studies Inst. Res.
Surv. No. 6, U.S. Army Command & Staff College 177-81 (1987), available at http://www-cgsc.
army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/historic/hist_c4_pt1.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). See also
Lieutenant Colonel Gary L. Bounds, Notes on Military Elite Units, Combat Studies Inst. Rep.
No. 4, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College 4 (1984), available at http://www-cgsc.
army.mil/carl/download/csipubs/bounds2.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (offering further
discussion of the First Special Service Force).
2. McMichael, supra note 2, at 186-92, available at http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/
download/csipubs/historic/hist_c4_pt2.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
3. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, JOINT PUBLICATION 1-02, DEP’T OF DEFENSE DICTIONARY
OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 100 (2004), available at http://www.dtic.mil/
doctrine/jel/doddict/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter DOD DICTIONARY], defines a
combined operation as one “conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together
for the accomplishment of a single mission.”
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visible and well-known partnership is embodied in the NORAD
5
Agreement , which created the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD) located in Colorado Springs, Colorado. This
Cold War-era partnership retains its relevance and vitality during the
evolving transnational or terrorist threat to the two nations. In an
Exchange of Notes in December 2002, the U.S. and Canada “affirmed
the merits of broadening bi-national defence arrangements in order
to:
1. prevent or mitigate threats or attacks by terrorists or others
on Canada or the United States; and
2. ensure a cooperative and well-coordinated response to national requests for military assistance in relation to terrorist,
or other, threats or attacks, natural disasters, or other major
6
emergencies in Canada or the United States.”
Another, more recent, example of military cooperation is Operation APOLLO, in which U.S. and Canadian infantry units conducted
combat operations in Afghanistan against Taliban and Al Qaeda
forces.7
Unity of effort in a combined or multinational operation is a
8
fundamental principle of operation. The objectives of the operation
must be clearly defined by the leader of the operation and supported
by each member nation. The planning and conduct of such combined
operations must take into account the national and international legal
obligations of the respective nations. Differing obligations may result
4. DOD DICTIONARY defines a multinational operation as a “collective term to describe
military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the
structure of a coalition or alliance.” Id. at 351.
5. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Mar. 11, 1981, U.S.-Can.,
33 U.S.T. 1277 [hereinafter NORAD Agreement]. This Agreement was extended until May 12,
2006 by an Exchange of Notes signed at Washington June 16, 2000. Negotiations will begin in
2005 for the renewal of the Agreement.
6. Agreement regarding Canada-United States Cooperation in Broadening Bi-National
Defence Arrangements for North American Security, Exchange of Notes, Dec. 9 2002, U.S.Can. The text of this agreement is available at http://www.canadianembassy.org/defence/texten.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
7. Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien provided Canadian Forces to support the
United States operation in Afghanistan (Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) in response to
the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty by NATO Secretary General Lord
Robertson. The Canadian Forces’ Contribution to the International Campaign Against
Terrorism, CANADIAN NAT’L DEF. (Mar. 7, 2002), at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/
view_news_e.asp?id=388 (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). [hereinafter Canadian Forces’
Contribution].
8. CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3.0,DOCTRINE FOR JOINT
OPERATIONS VI-3 (2001).
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in an inability to operate smoothly as a combined force, pursuing a
9
common goal. These challenges to the “interoperability” of Canadian and U.S. Forces are not insurmountable.
Military attorneys are essential to the process of achieving this
interoperability. They assist in identifying the potential points of friction, such as critical differences in rules for use of force or employment of certain weapons, so that the differences can be resolved during the planning of the operation. This article will address the role
that attorneys and the law play in promoting unity of effort in combined U.S. and Canadian operations. It will (1) provide an overview
of the process by which attorneys in each nation’s armed forces provide legal advice on operations, (2) identify the key differences in international legal obligations of each nation, and (3) discuss how national differences can be resolved, as illustrated by the issues of land
mines and use of deadly force.
II. LEGAL REVIEW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
A. U.S. Approach
The Department of Defense has established a comprehensive
program to ensure the law of war10 is understood and complied with
by all members of the armed forces. One of the central requirements
of this program is that qualified legal advisers review all plans, policies, and rules of engagement to ensure their consistency with the law
11
of war obligations of the United States. The discipline of “opera12
tional law” provides the framework for legal advisers to fulfill this
responsibility.
9. DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 270, defines interoperability as the “ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or
forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”
10. U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE 5100.77, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM 4.1 (Dec.
9,1998) [hereinafter LAW OF WAR PROGRAM]. The law of war is described as “[t]hat part of
international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is often called the law of
armed conflict. The law of war encompasses all international law for the conduct of hostilities
binding on the United States or its individual citizens, including treaties and international
agreements to which the United States is a party, and applicable customary international law.”
Id. at 3.1.
11. Id. at 4.1. Paragraphs 5.3.3, 5.7.3, and 5.8.6 extend this requirement to the components
of Department of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commanders of
Combatant Commands.
12. Operational Law is defined as the “body of domestic, foreign, and international law
that impacts specifically upon the activities of U.S. Forces in war and operations other than
war. . . . It includes military justice, administrative and civil law, legal assistance, claims, pro-
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1. Emergence of Operational Law. Attorneys in the U.S. military trace their lineage to 1775, when George Washington appointed
Colonel William Tudor as the first Judge Advocate of the Continental
Army.13 Since the beginning, these attorneys, more commonly referred to as Judge Advocates, have provided advice to commanders
in every major conflict, including the Civil War, World Wars I and II,
and the Korean War. The practice during the pre-Vietnam era consisted of the traditional legal disciplines of military criminal law, contracts, claims, and administrative law. Judge Advocates also played a
key role in prosecuting war crimes cases in Germany and Japan.
The Vietnam War marked the beginning of the expansion of the
practice of Judge Advocates in combat. Colonel Frederic L. Borch
III notes in his excellent historical account of Army Lawyers in Military Operations that individual Judge Advocates began to push the
boundaries of traditional practice out by engaging in such issues as
“. . .the investigation and documentation of war crimes, the classification of detainees and treatment of prisoners of war, Law of War instruction, and the provision of advice to host nation authorities on a
wide range of subjects.”14 Nevertheless, in the years following Vietnam, Judge Advocates in the Army and other services concentrated
primarily on the familiar areas of military criminal law and administrative law. They taught the Law of War to officers and enlisted, as
required by the Department of Defense Law of War Program,15 but
rarely became involved in the planning and conduct of military operations. The U.S. intervention on the island of Grenada in October
1983 served to refocus attention on the complex legal dimension of
modern combat.
The U.S. mission in Grenada, called Operation URGENT
FURY, was relatively straightforward – rescue American citizens endangered by the spiraling violence and assist the Caribbean Peacekeeping Force in restoring order.16 Yet, the brief engagement produced a host of legal issues which had not been anticipated by the

curement law, national security law, fiscal law, and international law.” INT’L AND
OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL,
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK A-1 (1994) [hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
13. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, available at
http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETINTERNET/HOMEPAGES/AC/TJAGSAWEB.NSF/
Main?OpenFrameset (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
14. FREDERIC L. BORCH III, JUDGE ADVOCATES IN COMBAT 51 (2001).
15. LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 5.5.1.
16. See BORCH, supra note 14, at 61–62.
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Judge Advocates accompanying the U.S. Forces. Among the more
pressing concerns were:
• Developing rules of engagement for the combat and peace17
keeping phases of the operation
• determining the status of detainees, including a number of
Cuban nationals
• safeguarding and transporting to safety several diplomatic
personnel from the former Soviet Union, North Korea, and
Cuba
18
• investigating alleged violations of the law of war
These issues were resolved, although not without some missteps
and false starts. Following an after-action review of the legal issues in
URGENT FURY, the Judge Advocate General’s School of the
Army, in 1986, recommended that the new discipline of operational
law be developed.19 Since that time, the Army and the other services
have designed concepts of organization, operation, and training to ensure that military attorneys are well equipped and available to advise
commanders on the legal dimensions of military operations. The approach that the Army has taken is representative of the other services.
2. Organization. Judge Advocates go where the work is. They
are positioned with commands in such a manner that they can operate
as an integral member of the staff. The senior Judge Advocate (or
Staff Judge Advocate) responsible for providing legal support to a
unit conducting operations will tailor the support for each specific operation by detailing judge advocates to the appropriate command or
staff elements. The detailed Judge Advocates will deploy with the
unit and will be normally be under the technical supervision of the
Staff Judge Advocate, receiving guidance, direction and assistance.20
In fact, Judge Advocates have been so close to the action that they

17. Judge Advocates were not involved in the development of rules of engagement for the
combat phase of URGENT FURY, but helped draft the rules for the peacekeeping phase. Id. at
72–73.
18. Id. at 71–72.
19. David E. Graham, Operational Law-A Concept Comes of Age, ARMY LAW. 9, 10 (July
1987).
20. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-100, LEGAL SUPPORT TO OPERATIONS, para.
2.4.2 (2000) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 27-100].
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have occasionally been drawn into the conflict, with at least one
21
Judge Advocate being decorated for heroism in Iraq.
3. Operating Concept. The Army’s concept for providing legal
support to military operations is detailed in Field Manual Number 27100. The mission statement succinctly describes how Judge Advocates will provide timely and relevant legal advice to commanders in
challenging, and sometimes ambiguous, circumstances:
“Pursuing the mission in the 21st Century will challenge judge advocates in three distinct ways. First, judge advocates must become
increasingly refined as soldiers and lawyers. Judge advocates must
understand how the Army will accomplish its various missions, and
how to identify and resolve legal issues arising during these missions. . . . They must be thoroughly grounded in all core legal disciplines to be effective in a fluid operational environment. They
must be increasingly knowledgeable in international law as the
Army cooperates with other nations’ forces to secure United States
interests world-wide.

Second, judge advocates must become more involved in the military decision-making process in critical planning cells, and at lower
levels of command. As information technology increases the speed of
decision-making and allows fusion of information in distinct cells, it
becomes critical for judge advocates to be located where the relevant
picture of the battlefield is received, evaluated, resolved, and affected. Otherwise, legal advice will not be timely or effective. To be
proactive, the judge advocate must be present. As information technology empowers decision-makers at lower levels of command, judge
advocates must be present there.
Third, judge advocates must be capable of expanding the level of
legal support to meet the mission demands of a force projection
army. . . . Judge advocates, in both the active and reserve components, must plan for the legal resources to meet these demands, and
must be prepared to provide services with the deploying unit, the
22
power projection platform, or home station.”

21. THE REGIMENTAL REP. (JAG Legal Center and Sch. Alumni Ass’n), Fall 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.tjagsaalumni.org/rrpdf/2003fall.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005). Four
members of a legal team were on patrol in Baghdad on August 7, 2003, when another nearby
patrol was ambushed and several of its soldiers wounded. The team immediately went to the
assistance of the other soldiers, returned fire, and helped evacuate the wounded. Captain Keith
Bracey, Warrant Officer One Donnell McIntosh, Master Sergeant Brian Quarm, and Specialist
Benjamin Prutz were each subsequently awarded the Bronze Star Medal with “V” device for
heroism. Captain Bracey was also awarded the Purple Heart for a wound he suffered during the
action.
22. FIELD MANUAL 27-100, supra note 20.
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4. Training. The evolving discipline of operational law is a key
element in the curriculum of The Judge Advocate General’s School
of the Army (the JAG School). Both the Basic Course, designed to
educate attorneys just entering the Judge Advocate General’s Corps,
and the Graduate Course, an LL.M. program for career attorneys, include extensive study of international and operational law issues. 23
The materials and seminars reflect the lessons learned from the past
twenty years of military operations. The JAG School also conducts
one-week courses for those attorneys entering positions that require
knowledge of operational law.
B. Canadian Approach
The legal branch of the Canadian Forces traces its distinguished
history back to 1911, with Judge Advocates serving in theaters of operation during World Wars I and II, as well as in the Korean Con24
flict. The Canadian Judge Advocates, much as their U.S. counterparts, practiced traditional law during these conflicts, primarily
engaging in military criminal law, personal legal assistance to soldiers,
and claims against the government.25
1. Emergence of Operational Law. The Canadian Forces Legal
26
Branch expanded its focus to include operational law in the 1990’s.
Just as the U.S. military had in Grenada, the Canadian Forces experienced a watershed event that reinforced the need for increased emphasis on Judge Advocate participation in military operations. The
Canadian Airborne Regiment deployed to support the United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNSOSOM) in 1993. While the overall
performance of the unit was excellent, the torture and death of a Somali detainee at the hands of a small number of paratroopers over-

23. See JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER AND SCHOOL, supra note 14 (offering a history of the JAG School and a description of the Basic and Graduate Courses available).
24. ARTHUR R. MCDONALD, CANADA’S MILITARY LAWYERS 16, 21–23, 45–60, & 77–83
(2002).
25. Id. at 45–70, 79.
26. Kenneth W. Watkin, The Operational Lawyer: An Essential Resource for the Modern
Commander
13,
available
at
http://www.forces.gc.ca/jag/operational_law/TheOperationalLawyer_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28,
2005). The working definition of operational law for the Directorate of Law/Operations is
“[t]hat body of law, both domestic and international, impacting specifically upon legal issues
associated with the planning for and deployment of Canadian Forces in both peacetime and
combat environments.” Id. at 1.

WALSH1.DOC

322

9/15/2005 10:10 AM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 15:315

shadowed the entire mission.27 The resulting Board of Inquiry recommended, among other actions, that legal officers deploy with units
on training and actual missions to advise commanders and soldiers on
all legal aspects of the operations.28
Throughout the 1990’s, Canadian Judge Advocates deployed
with and provided crucial legal support to Canadian Forces during the
Persian Gulf War (1990-1991), and peace keeping or peace enforcement operations in Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, Italy, East Timor,
Rwanda and Ethiopia.29 The advice provided by these attorneys
ranged from the legitimacy of objectives in the bombing campaign in
30
Bosnia to the crafting of rules of engagement for Canadian units in
Rwanda.31 When Canadian naval, air, land and special forces de32
ployed to Afghanistan in Operation APOLLO following the terrorist attacks on September 11, several Judge Advocates accompanied
the forces.33
2. Organization. The demonstrated need for legal advisers in
these increasingly complex military operations drove a restructuring
of the Legal Branch of the Canadian Forces. Commanders began requesting lawyers to accompany them on operations, and the Legal
Branch accommodated them by assigning Judge Advocates to nineteen field offices, all under the supervision of the Deputy Judge Ad34
vocate General for Operations. This Deputy also assigns Judge Advocates to support the units that deploy on missions. This differs
somewhat from the U.S. approach, in that the deployed Canadian
Judge Advocates are directly responsible to the Judge Advocate
General, rather than to the commander of the unit to which they are
detailed. The rationale for the Canadian approach is that it “enhances the provision of independent legal advice.”35 This is in slight
contrast to the U.S. practice, which allows the Judge Advocate to be
under the command of the commander of the supported unit.

27. MCDONALD, supra note 23, at 154–63.
28. Watkin, supra note 25, at 13.
29. Id. at 5–6.
30. MCDONALD, supra note 23, at 172.
31. Id. at 175.
32. Canadian Forces’ Contribution, supra note 8.
33. Watkin, supra note 25, at 6.
34. Id. at 182–84.
35. Jerry S.T. Pitzul, Operational Law and the Legal Professional: A Canadian Perspective,
51 A.F. L. REV. 311, 312 (2001).
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3. Operating Concept. The Canadian Judge Advocates supporting deployed units perform essentially the same tasks as their
U.S. counterparts. The Judge Advocate General of the Canadian
Forces, Brigadier General Jerry S.T. Pitzul, in an address at the U.S.
Air Force Judge Advocate General’s School, provided just a sample
of the legal issues in which Judge Advocates are engaged:
• Legal basis or mandate for the operation
• Use of force guidelines
• Targeting
• Review of Operations Plans
• Legality of weapons
• Investigation of alleged war crimes
• Treatment of civilians and refugees
• Instruction in Law of Armed Conflict
• Negotiation of Status of Forces Agreements36
As mentioned earlier, the ability of the Judge Advocates to provide this operational legal advice while deployed with Canadian
Forces is an essential component of the Legal Branch’s mission. This
presence with the deployed unit gives a greater understanding of the
operating environment and challenges facing the commander and
soldiers. It also enables the Judge Advocate to provide more timely
37
advice during fast-paced operations. Superb training of the Judge
Advocates in the relevant law and operations planning process is also
a critical requirement.
4. Training. Spurred by recent experience and certainty of future deployments, the Legal Branch has generated an excellent pro38
gram of instruction in Operational Law. This two-week course integrates the academic with the practical and sharply hones the skills of
Judge Advocates who advise and deploy with Canadian Forces. The
curriculum comprises the international legal basis for military intervention, the process for determining the propriety of selecting targets
for attack, and the development of rules of engagement. The faculty
speaks from the experience of several recent assignments to areas of
conflict, such as Afghanistan and Haiti. Because most Canadian military operations are conducted in coalition with the forces of other na-

36. Id. at 311–21.
37. Watkin, supra note 25, at 15.
38. See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/
jag/main_e.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
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tions, including the U.S., a significant portion of the instruction addresses the intricacies of operating with allies that may be bound by
differing international legal obligations.
III. DIFFERING TREATY OBLIGATIONS
The law that binds the Canadian and U.S. Forces affects the ability of the armed forces of each nation to operate with a combined effect. This law includes not only the treaties to which they are a party,
but also the national or domestic law of each nation. As an example,
U.S. Forces are restricted in their ability to operate within the U.S. by
the Posse Comitatus Act.39 Canadian Forces have greater statutory
authority for providing assistance to law enforcement agencies and
40
other Canadian Government agencies. For purposes of considering
combined operations outside the national borders, though, the points
of departure are primarily in the following areas:
A. Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention
The Government of Canada is a party to both Additional Proto41
42
cols I and II. The U.S. has not has not ratified either Protocol, but
considers most of the provisions to be applicable as customary international law.43 The U.S. does object to many of the provisions of Protocol I that would expand the definitions of international armed conflicts and combatants, so Judge Advocates should alert operation
planners to these areas of disagreement.

39. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000).
40. See Watkin, supra note 25, at 7 (describing Canada’s use of armed forces to assist governmental agencies).
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,
16 I.L.M. 1442.
43. INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S LEGAL
CENTER & SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 11 (2003), available at
http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/jagcnetinternet/homepages/ac/tjagsaweb.nsf (last visited Feb. 28,
2005).
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B. Anti-Personnel Mine Convention (APM)44
The Government of Canada not only signed and ratified the
APM, but also was a major proponent of this development in international humanitarian law. The U.S., on the other hand, has not ratified
the convention. It has, however, embraced a policy that advances the
intent behind the treaty. This still leaves a situation in which U.S.
Forces may employ anti-personnel mines during a combined operation while Canadian Forces would be prohibited from employing the
same method of warfare.
IV. SPECIFIC ISSUES AFFECTING INTEROPERABILITY
Past and current operations in which Canadian and U.S. Forces
operate together are characterized by a high degree of compatibility
in techniques, tactics, and procedures. Yet, there are a few differences in law and policy that affect interoperability of the forces. Two
such issues are:
• Use of land mines
• Use of deadly force to protect property
A. Use of Land Mines
Land mines, designed for use against enemy combatants (antipersonnel mines) and against armored vehicles (anti-tank mines), are
very effective in defending friendly forces against enemy attack and
denying the enemy the use of key terrain. Nevertheless, the indiscriminate use of land mines by groups who fail to comply with the
Amended Protocol II (Mines Protocol) of the 1980 Conventional
45
Weapons Treaty has created a humanitarian problem in countries
around the world.46 The types of mines used and the manner of employment are at the heart of the problem.
Persistent land mines are those that do not self-destruct or selfdeactivate within a relatively short, pre-determined time. These
44. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production, and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines (APL) and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211, 36
I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter APM Convention].
45. Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and other
Devices (Protocol II) of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, 19 I.L.M. 1523 [hereinafter Mine Protocol].
46. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Landmine Policy White Paper, (Feb. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/30047.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter Landmine
Policy White Paper].
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mines remain lethal for years, even decades. Land mines that cannot
be detected using available technology also present a long-term threat
to non-combatants. The Mine Protocol addressed these and other
aspects of anti-personnel mine use, including a requirement that the
party laying mines assume the responsibility to prevent their irresponsible or indiscriminate use.47
The international community built upon the foundation of the
Mine Protocol in an effort to further reduce the impact of antipersonnel mines on non-combatants. The Government of Canada
championed this effort, resulting in the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mines
48
49
Convention; Canada and 144 other nations have ratified the treaty.
The Canadian Forces, in compliance with the APM Convention,
cannot:
50
• use anti-personnel mines;
• develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or
transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel
mines; or
• assist, encourage or induce activities prohibited by the APM
51
Convention.
The U.S. continues to use anti-personnel mines in a manner consistent with the Mine Protocol. In fact, the current U.S. policy on
land mines exceeds the requirements for use of anti-personnel mines
under the Mine Protocol and addresses the use of anti-tank mines,
52
which are not covered under the APM Convention.
47. Mine Protocol, supra note 45, at Art. 3.
48. See THE ACRONYM INST. FOR DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Disarmament Documentation, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0212/doc01.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2005)
(discussing Canada’s role in the ratification of the Anti-Personnel Mines Convention).
49. See APM Convention, supra note 44. For an up-to-date list of the countries who have
signed the APM Convention, see INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, Anti-Personnel Landmines,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList2/Focus:Landmines?Open
Document (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
50. “Anti-personnel Mine” is defined as “a mine designed to be exploded by the presence,
proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure or kill one or more persons,”
while “mine” is defined as “a munition designed to be placed under, on or near the ground or
other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle.” APM Convention, supra note 44, 2056 U.N.T.S. at 242, art. 2.
51. OFF. OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, CANADIAN NAT’L DEF. JOINT DOCTRINE
MANUAL, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVELS [B-GJ005-104/FP-021] para. A001, at 5A-1 (Aug. 18, 2001), available at http://www.dcds.forces.ca/
jointDoc/docs/LOAC_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT].
52. Landmine Policy White Paper, supra note 46. To reduce humanitarian hazards posed
by mines, the U.S. will, among other actions:
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The APM Convention does not prohibit the use of antipersonnel mines that are command-detonated. The Canadian Forces
are authorized to use anti-personnel mines, such as the Claymore
Mine, if they are detonated by mechanical or electronic means.53 In
this respect, the Canadian and U.S. Forces are fully interoperable.
The use by U.S. Forces of any other type of anti-personnel mine
poses a challenge for Canadian Forces, however. Imagine, for instance, a combined Canadian and United States military operation in
which the forces are co-located. The U.S., under its current policy,
may employ anti-personnel landmines as part of the defensive perimeter around the combined force. These mines may or may not be
command-detonated. How does this use of landmines prohibited by
the APM Convention affect the operations of the Canadian Forces?
The Government of Canada became a party to the APM Convention with the Statement of Understanding that the mere participation in combined operations with a non-party State would not be a
violation of the Convention.54 However, the Canadian Forces may
not use anti-personnel mines other than those that are commanddetonated and may not request the non-party State, such as the U.S.,
to use anti-personnel mines in the defense of the Canadian Forces.55
In the example above, if the combined force is under the command
and control of a U.S. commander, the Canadian Force would recognize the right of the U.S. Force to defend itself through the use of
anti-personnel mines, although the Canadian Force could not be actively involved in the planning or emplacement of the mines.56 If the

•
•

After the year 2010 no longer use persistent landmines of any type;
Develop alternatives to current persistent landmines that incorporate enhanced selfdestructing/self-deactivating technologies; and
• Employ only those landmines that exceed the detectability specifications of the Mine
Protocol.
53. LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 51, at para. A002, at 5A-2.
54. Id. at para. A001, 5A-1 (“It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in
the context of operations, exercises or other military activity sanctioned by the United nations
or otherwise conducted in accordance with international law, the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations, exercise, or other military activity conducted in combination with the armed forces of States not a party to the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be considered to be
assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms in article 1, paragraph 1 (c).”).
55. Id. at para. A002, 5A-2.
56. See id. (“The right of states which are not signatories or parties to the APM Convention to use anti-personnel mines in self-defence is not precluded by the Convention.”).
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combined force is under the command of a Canadian officer, than
57
anti-personnel mines could not be used under any circumstances.
The Canadian approach to use of anti-personnel mines reconciles
that nation’s legal obligation under the APM Convention with the
practical concerns of operating with the U.S. and other states not parties to the Convention. The combined forces commander and planning staff must recognize the legal and policy limitations on Canada’s
use of landmines and construct the operations plan in a way that will
provide for protection of the combined force without jeopardizing
Canada’s status under the APM.
B. Use of Deadly Force to Protect Property
Both Canada and U.S. Forces regulate the use of force in opera58
tions through rules of engagement (ROE). Each nation bases these
rules on national and international law, national policy, and operational requirements. Each nation also distinguishes between rules for
armed conflict and rules for peacetime operations short of armed conflict.59
The law and policy upon which Canadian and U.S. ROE are
based are generally very similar. As a result, there are usually few
differences that must be resolved in developing ROE for combined
U.S.-Canadian operations. Limitations on use of weapons, such as
those on anti-personnel mines previously discussed, present one area
of difference. Another area is the use of force to protect property in
operations short of armed conflict.
The Canadian approach to ROE in peacetime operations and
those short of armed conflict recognizes that Canadian Forces have

57. Id. (“The use of anti-personnel mines by the combined force will not be authorized in
cases where Canada is in command of a combined force.”).
58. The Department of Defense defines ROE for U.S. Forces as the “[d]irectives issued by
competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which the
United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.” DOD DICTIONARY, supra note 4, at 461. The Canadian definition is similar: “ROE are
orders issued by military authority that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, manner,
and limitations within which force, or actions which might be construed as provocative, may be
applied to achieve military objectives in accordance with national policy and the law.”
CANADIAN NAT’L DEF., USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, at 5-5 (Nov. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.dcds.forces.gc.ca/jointDoc/docs/B-GJ-005-300_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS].
59. Id. at 5-6. For the unclassified policy on U.S. ROE, see CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, INSTRUCTION 3121.01A, STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR U.S
FORCES, (Jan. 15, 2000), available at http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/dod/docs/cjcs_sroe.pdf
(last visisted Feb. 28, 2005) [hereinafter SROE].
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no authority to use force (except for self-defense) unless authorized
60
through ROE. The defense of Canadian military or non-military
property is not included in the right of self-defense, so ROE must
specifically authorize the use of force for that purpose.61 This is similar to the U.S. approach to the defense of property. The authority to
use force in the defense against the attempted theft, damage or destruction of specific property is addressed in ROE. For example, the
U.S. Forces operating in the peace enforcement operation in Kosovo
in 1999 received the following authority to defend property:
“You may also fire against an individual who attempts to take possession of friendly force weapons, ammunition, or property with
62
designated special status, and there is no way of avoiding this.”

The authority for Canadian Forces to use deadly force to protect
property may not be as extensive as the authority exercised by U.S.
Forces. The Chief of Defence Staff of the Canadian Forces has stated
that such authority “will not be all-inclusive and will generally be restricted to property with designated special status. . .”63 The U.S.
Forces are frequently authorized to use deadly force to protect a
broad category of military property (arms, ammunition, shoulderfired rockets, etc.) as distinct from other property that has been designated with a special status.
Both nations address this potential difference in authority in
their doctrine and ROE. The Canadian publication on ROE acknowledges that “diplomatic considerations may ultimately limit legitimate uses of force, or they may permit a greater latitiude in the
use of force than would be permitted in a purely Canadian operation. . . .”64 Both Canada and the U.S. take the position that their respective forces may operate under combined or multi-national ROE
only after the rules are approved by the Chief of Defence Staff for the
Canadian Forces65 or by the President or Secretary of Defense for
U.S. Forces.66 Clearly, the optimal solution is to craft a single set of
ROE for the combined force, taking into consideration the legal obligations and restraints of each nation’s armed force.

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, supra note 58, at 5-6.
Id.
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK,. supra note 43, at 99.
USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, supra note 58, at 5-3.
Id. at 5-7.
Id. at 5-7.
SROE, supra note 59, at para. 1c(1), at Enclosure A.
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If there is a difference in authority, such as using force in the defense of property, that cannot be resolved, each nation has a “default” position. The U.S. Forces will operate under the Standing
Rules of Engagement67 after first notifying the other participating
forces of this action. The Canadian Chief of Defense Staff may
choose one of the following alternatives:
• caveat the combined or multi-national ROE for Canadian
Forces personnel, that is, clearly identify in the ROE which
rules will not apply to the CF;
• issue-specific ROE for Canadian Forces
68
• withdraw Canadian contingent from the mission.
An incident during the UN peace-keeping mission in Haiti in
1995 (Operation Pivot) illustrates the occasional conflict in selfdefense authority between Canadian and U.S. Forces and how this
conflict may be resolved. As recorded in Canada’s Military Lawyers:
One of the initial legal problems was the difference between the
Rules of Engagement applicable to the Canadians and those followed by the Americans and other UN contingents. Canada had
stricter limitations on the use of deadly force than these others. In
one example, an American Captain who was in charge of four or
five Canadian military engineers saw a theft take place and tried to
catch the thief. When he could not, he ordered the Canadians to
shoot the culprit. The Canadians declined, citing the limitations in
their Rules of Engagement that prohibited shooting someone who
was running away and of no immediate danger to the Canadians or
69
those under their protection.

In this instance, the differing authority for the use of deadly force
in self-defense and defense of property was resolved with the issuance
of ROE specific to the Canadian contingent.
V. CONCLUSION
There may be sound policy or political reasons for the leaders of
our respective nations not to participate in a combined or multinational operation. National interests and international relations differ. Nevertheless, the differing legal obligations with respect to use of
force and weapons should not be an obstacle to a combined military
effort. The differences are few and the doctrine and practice of each

67. Id. at para. 1c(2), at Enclosure A.
68. See USE OF FORCE IN CF OPERATIONS, supra note 58, at para. 507, at 5-6 (“The CDS is
the sole authority for the authorization of ROE or changes to the ROE.”).
69. MCDONALD, supra note 23, at 176.
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nation provides sufficient flexibility to achieve unity of effort while
honoring the obligations of each nation. Judge Advocates in both
Canadian and U.S. Forces continue to be instrumental in weaving the
fabric of that combined effort.

